Business Torts by Hosch, Charles M.
SMU Law Review
Volume 56




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




HE struggles in all business torts are first to declare, understanda-
bly and predictably, where fair competition ends and actionable
practices begin-and then, having declared it, to provide an effec-
tive remedy that both encourages the maintenance of commercial moral-
ity and enhances, or at least does not diminish, efficient and vigorous
competition. It is a challenge worthy of the bar's best efforts, for it em-
braces every ambition, and every emotion, in American business.
The effort to put structure to this field has been largely ad hoc, partly
statutory and partly by common law development, as courts and legisla-
tures have reacted to new and aggressive efforts to seize competitive ad-
vantage in a changing economy. As a result, the field of "business torts"
is often studied not as a unified field, but as a series of separate-though
linked-causes of action, each focused on particular conduct or situa-
tions. This article reviews developments during the Survey period in
seven such causes of action.
I. FALSE ADVERTISING
The heartbeat of the modern law of false advertising is Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), which provides:
(a) (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or ser-
vices .... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.1
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In IQ Products Co. v. Pennzoil Products Co.,2 the plaintiff claimed the
defendants' advertising (and, in particular, product labeling) was both lit-
erally and impliedly false. The competitors sold competing brands of
roadside tire inflators, each being a can of chemicals under pressure. A
motorist experiencing a flat tire could pull over to the side of road and
insert the nozzle of this can into the tire. A gas propellant inside the can
would then spray its contents all around the inside of the tire, reinflating
the tire and at the same time forming a seal along the inside that would
temporarily patch the leak long enough for the motorist to get to a ser-
vice station where a better patch could be made or the tire could be re-
placed altogether. What caused the debate in this case was how to
describe the propellant used in the cans. Some such propellants may be
flammable or explosive. This is particularly an issue with respect to tires,
because repairmen making permanent repairs sometimes weld the wheel
rims and if the tire has been re-inflated with a flammable or explosive
mixture, an errant spark can cause an explosion. 3
In IQ Products, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants' "Fix-A-Flat"
brand tire inflator was both flammable and explosive, but that the de-
fendants had failed to label it accordingly, as allegedly required by the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act ("FHSA"), 4 and had instead falsely
advertised that Fix-A-Flat was "nonexplosive." '5
Court was not the plaintiff's first resort. In fact, IQ had been com-
plaining about Fix-A-Flat to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and
the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"), which has been re-
sponsible for enforcing the FHSA and its implementing regulations since
1994. The FTC had referred IQ's complaint to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, and the CPSC had investigated, but neither
they nor any other federal agency took any other action. Eventually the
plaintiff filed suit in federal court and asserted that the defendants' fail-
ure to label the Fix-A-Flat cans as "flammable" or "explosive," in accor-
dance with what it believed to be the condition of the cans and its
interpretation of the FHSA, constituted a violation of Section 43(a). 6
The FHSA does not create a private cause of action, however. 7 As a
result, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit inter-
preted the plaintiff's action as essentially an attempt to enforce the label-
ing requirements of the FHSA through a private right of action not
permitted under that act, but instead entrusted to the CPSC.8 As a result,
it held that the "defendants' failure to label the product in keeping with
FHSA regulations, even if true, does not constitute a false or misleading
2. IQ Prods. Co. v. Pennzoil Prods. Co., 305 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2002).
3. Id. at 370.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-78 (2002).
5. IQ Prods. Co., 305 F.3d at 370.
6. Id. at 373.




statement that is actionable under the Lanham Act."9
Regardless of whether the defendants should have labeled their prod-
uct as "flammable," or whether IQ was the proper party to bring such a
claim, the defendants certainly did label their product as "nonexplosive,"
and the plaintiffs alleged the defendants knew this not to be true and in
fact to be literally false. If literally false, the court would assume that it
actually misled consumers, without requiring any evidence of such decep-
tion from the plaintiff.10 The district court had found the statement that
Fix-A-Flat was "nonexplosive" not to be literally false. The court of ap-
peals did not decide whether there truly was a genuine issue of material
fact on that point, however, because it concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to produce competent summary judgment evidence that it was
harmed by the defendants' allegedly false and misleading advertisement
in any event. The court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
lower court to exclude under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 the testimony
of both plaintiff's expert witnesses on the materiality of the defendants'
false statements (that is, the effect on the buying decisions of the consum-
ers), and the damage to the plaintiff as a result." Both experts had based
their conclusions on the combined effect of the "defendants' failure to
label the product as flammable and advertisement of it as non-explosive,"
and the court had rejected the first of those claims as a matter of law.12
Survey and research data may be challenged some way, but the lack of
survey or research data, or at least of some objective data that could be
subject to testing and verification, can be fatal to a claim. In IQ Products,
neither of the plaintiff's experts had conducted market or survey research
or tests to support their conclusions that consumers would have pur-
chased their client's tire inflators were it not for the defendants' allegedly
misleading statements about the explosiveness (or non-explosiveness) of
the defendants' own product.1 3 The court harkened back to its point
from the earlier Pizza Hut case, explaining that "the plaintiff may not
rely on the judge or the jury to determine, 'based solely upon his or her
intuitive reaction, whether the advertisement is deceptive." 14
B. STANDING
Standing to bring a Lanham Act claim also came before the Fifth Cir-
cuit. In Ford v. Nylcare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc.,15 a surgeon
alleged that a variety of health maintenance organizations ("HMOs")
with whom he had contracted had published deceptive advertisements
not concerning him exactly-at least not individually, or by name-but
9. Id.
10. Id. at 375 (citing Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489 (5th Cir.
2000)).
11. Id. at 376.
12. Id. at 377.
13. Id. at 376.
14. Id. at 376 n.41 (citing Pizza Hut, Inc., 227 F.3d at 497).
15. Ford v. Nylcare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2002).
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affecting him and decreasing his income nevertheless. He alleged that
the HMOs had falsely advertised that their management techniques
would improve health care quality and that they would allow patients and
doctors to make their own treatment decisions. He alleged that the de-
fendants' cost control measures undercut quality and rationed medical
care, sometimes against the will of doctors and patients, and reduced the
incomes of doctors, including his own. He also claimed "that, by at-
tracting new customers to the HMO's health plans, the allegedly decep-
tive advertising further reduces doctors' incomes because it increases the
HMO's market power over the price of medical services." 16
That there was a considerable reach between these allegedly deceptive
advertisements on one hand, and the allegedly reduced income of Dr.
Ford and others like him on the other, was not doubted, and the district
court held that Dr. Ford lacked prudential Lanham Act standing to bring
those claims under Section 43(a). 17 In a split opinion, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, but held that as a threshold matter-raised sua sponte-Dr.
Ford lacked Article III constitutional standing, and accordingly, it need
not reach the question of prudential Lanham Act standing at all.18 In a
specially concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Benavides agreed with the re-
sult but argued that it would have been preferable to determine the pru-
dential Lanhan Act standing issue first, rather than immediately address
the Article III standing issue. 19 In any event, however, there was no evi-
dence in the record to establish that the HMO's restrictive policies caused
a reduction in his income, or that those restrictive policies were estab-
lished or at least made more onerous as a result of increased market
power created by acquisition of new customers through the defendants'
allegedly deceptive ads.20 The causal connection was much too attenu-
ated-a point perhaps highlighted by the defendants' argument that Dr.
Ford's reduction in income "might have been a result of the fact that 'he
is not employed full time as a physician ... and spends a significant pe-
riod of time filming a fishing show for a sports network."'' Therefore,
his claim of standing was rejected.
16. Id. at 331.
17. See id. at 337 (Benavides, J., specially concurring) (citing Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001)). The Fifth Circuit had held that five factors
are relevant to the prudential standing analysis: "(1) the nature of the plaintiffs' alleged
injury . . . (2) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (3) the proximity or
remoteness of the party to the alleged injurious conduct; (4) the speculativeness of the
damages claims; and (5) the risk of duplicative damages or complexity in apportioning
damages." Id.
18. The court cited Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), in
holding that "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally
protective interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent
not conjectural or hypothetical ... [s]econd, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of ... [t]hird, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Ford, 301 F.3d at
332.
19. Id. at 334-39.
20. Id. at 333.




Where an advertisement may not be literally false on its face, but is
alleged to be impliedly false or misleading in the context in which it is
presented, a plaintiff must still show actual confusion or mistake in the
minds of the consumers or that such mistake or confusion is likely to
result. In Woodjoy Enterprises, Inc. v. Wise Cracker, Inc., the court held
that the plaintiffs' Lanham Act claims failed where they did not adduce
evidence that the defendants had actually misappropriated their goods,
that there had been any confusion or mistake in the minds of the consum-
ers, or that the plaintiffs had been harmed. 22
D. MISLEADING FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
In some circumstances, what has gone before, and is not clarified now,
may give rise to Section 43(a) claims as well. In Decorative Center of
Houston, LP v. Direct Response Publications, Inc.,23 a publisher wrote to
a decorative center's 131 tenants, soliciting them to place ads in a direc-
tory the publisher was proposing to publish. It seems the publisher had
published two authorized directories for the decorative center in each of
the two years before this, and according to the plaintiff, it now solicited
the same tenants for a new directory. The publisher did not mention or
distinguish this request from similar ones authorized in prior years by the
building's owner, nor did it mention that its contract had been bought
out, that it was no longer authorized to publish the center's official direc-
tories, and that it had agreed not to solicit tenants for advertising for the
"Decorative Center Houston 2002 and Decorative Center Houston 2003
Directories. '2 4 Even though the solicitations were not literally false, the
building owner claimed that its tenants were misled into believing that
the defendant's new directory was authorized in the same manner as the
building's own directory had been in the two preceding years, because the
defendant failed to inform the tenants that it was no longer the publisher
of the building's authorized directory. 25
Specifically, the building's owner alleged that the defendant misled the
tenants through two distinct sets of acts. One was sending solicitations
directly to all 131 tenants, stating "'[o]ur records currently show [certain]
information' about the tenant," and failing to explain that the publisher
was no longer authorized to publish the directory. 26 Interestingly, the
court observed that this claim seemed to invoke each of the two different
Section 43(a) theories, both "false advertising (typically asserted under 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)) and false designation of origin (generally pur-
22. Woodjoy Enters., Inc. v. Wise Cracker, Inc., No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-0560, 2002 WL
1878862 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2002).
23. Decorative Ctr. of Houston, LP v. Direct Response Publ'ns, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d
719 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
24. Id. at 722-23.
25. Id. at 723.
26. Id. at 726.
2003] 1175
SMU LAW REVIEW
sued under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)). '' 27 As to the false advertising
claim, while the statements in the publisher's solicitation were not liter-
ally false, it did appear to the court, construing the allegations in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, that the solicitation could be construed
as misleading with consequences of financial injury affecting interstate
commerce.28 Accordingly, the court could not conclude as a matter of
law that the owner would be "unable to establish any set of facts that
would constitute a viable false advertising claim," and though it warned
the damages might turn out to be insubstantial, it could not dismiss as a
matter of law the false advertising claim.29
With respect to the false designation of origin claim, the court reviewed
Fifth Circuit authority and concluded that the circuit had "not specifically
addressed a false designation of origin claim."'30 It appeared to have
tracked its required proof for a false advertising case, and one case from
the Eastern District of Texas had adopted a formulation of the Seventh
Circuit, 31 but the court "in an exercise of caution" decided to rely on the
elements of a § 1125(a)(1)(A) claim as articulated in King v. Ames, rather
than adopt another circuit's formulation of the elements of false designa-
tion of origin claims.32 Accordingly, the court reviewed the classic state-
ment of false advertising, concluded that the plaintiff had met its pleading
burden, and denied the motion to dismiss.33
The court also noted certain "unspecified, generalized allegations" that
the defendant had "made false or misleading oral statements to some te-
nants, which caused some" of the tenants to place ads in the defendant's
directory thinking that they were advertising in the plaintiff's directory
(after which they would not want to place ads in the plaintiff's direc-
tory).34 The allegations of these oral statements did not include their
time, place or the content, or identify the speakers or recipients, and so
were held insufficient to support the plaintiff's Lanham Act claim. Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that it was premature on a motion to dis-
miss to make a conclusive determination with respect to those statements,
and that the issue should be addressed by a summary judgment motion or
a trial.35
E. DEPENDENCE ON OTHER CLAIMS
Where false advertising claims depend on other claims, the loss of the
other claims will necessarily doom the false advertising claims as well. In
27. Id. at 727.
28. Id. at 728.
29. Id. at 728 n.15.
30. Id. at 729.
31. First Nat'l Reserve, LC v. Vaughan, 931 F. Supp. 463, 466 n.4 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
32. Decorative Ctr., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 729-30 (citing King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 373-
74 (5th Cir. 1999)).
33. Id. at 730.
34. Id. at 726.
35. Id. at 727.
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Wood Arts Golf, Inc. v, Callaway Golf Co.,3 6 Callaway placed a name-
plate covering the weight cavity on the golf irons of its club design. Plain-
tiff held a patent on a certain decorative inlay and brought a variety of
causes of action against Callaway including patent infringement, false ad-
vertising and unfair competition. The court held that the nameplate did
not serve the same function as the plaintiff's patented decorative inlay
and as such, dismissed its infringement claim under the doctrine of
equivalents. 37 Because the plaintiff's claim of unfair competition was
wholly dependent upon a finding of patent infringement, it was
dismissed.38
F. SURVEY EVIDENCE
The capacity of survey evidence to support false advertising claims con-
tinued to be a fruitful source of dispute. In KIS, S.A. v. Foto Fantasy,
Inc.,3 9 the parties competed in the photo booth industry. The plaintiffs
alleged that by placing sketches of Tom Cruise and Marilyn Monroe bear-
ing the phrase "Scan in Your Favorite Celebrities" outside their booths,
the Defendants had violated the Lanham Act because it created confu-
sion as to the "affiliation, connection, or association" of these celebrities
with the defendants' booths, and constituted false advertising by implying
that they endorsed the defendants' booths.40 The plaintiffs presented sur-
vey evidence to support their claim that this confusion led users to use the
defendants' booths more than they used the plaintiffs.' The defendants
moved to strike the survey evidence, claiming that the survey universe
did not mirror the actual consumers of the defendants' products, the ex-
pert's questions were improperly leading, and the expert only showed dis-
torted pictures rather than the actual booth.41 Under the circumstances,
however, the court concluded that the universe was large enough for the
results to be admissible, the questions were not too leading, and the pic-
tures did not appear to the court to distort the machines. Accordingly,
the defendants' criticisms went only to the appropriate weight to be given
to the survey, and not to admissibility itself.42
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
The difference between tortious interference with a contract which al-
ready exists, and tortious interference with what is alleged to be a pro-
spective contract or a favorable business relationship, is of enormous
significance. 43 Where a contract presently exists, the competition for the
value represented by that contract has ended in favor of the contracting
36. Wood Arts Golf, Inc. v. Callaway Golf Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
37. Id. at 471.
38. Id.
39. KIS, S.A. v. Foto Fantasy, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
40. Id. at 969.
41. Id. at 969, 971.
42. Id. at 973.
43. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001).
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parties, and the stability of that relationship from third parties remains to
be protected. This is not the case with respect to "prospective" contracts,
however, where there may still be room for competition. "Tortious inter-
ference" may therefore mean two very different things, according to the
nature of the thing supposed to have been interfered with, but the cases
often present mixed fact patterns in which the challenged conduct is al-
leged to have interfered both with existing contracts and with contracts
yet hoped for.
A. STATING A CLAIM
The landmark case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges established that,
in order to support a claim for tortious interference with prospective con-
tracts or favorable business relationships, plaintiffs must show commis-
sion of an independent, tortious, or wrongful act.44 Business or
commercial disparagement might constitute such an independent tort. At
least one court refused to discount that possibility "in the highly deferen-
tial context of a fraudulent joinder inquiry," and hence, concluded that
the removing defendants had not established there was "absolutely no
possibility that [the plaintiff] would be able to establish a cause of action
[for tortious interference] against [the allegedly fraudulently-joined de-
fendant] in state court."'45
In Walsh v. America's Tele-Network Corp.,46 long distance users
brought suit against a tele-network company alleging RICO claims as
well as tortious interference and related claims arising generally from
claims of over-billing. The court held that the long distance users failed
to state RICO claims against the network companies because they had
not alleged that the "association in fact" enterprise had an existence sepa-
rate and apart from the alleged pattern of racketeering.47 The tortious
interference claims, however, did appear to state a cause of action against
defendant Integretel. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had ade-
quately pled that a contract subject to interference existed (called the
"ATN tariff"), that the defendant Integretel determined the fees that
ATN's customers (including the plaintiffs) should be billed, that In-
tegretel willfully and intentionally interfered with the contract by unlaw-
fully over-billing the plaintiffs in excess of the ATN tariff, and that this
over-billing was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiffs.48 This
was held sufficient to state a cause of action. 49
Similarly, in Decorative Center of Houston, LP v. Direct Response Pub-
lications, Inc.,5° the court addressed the question of what would now con-
44. Id. at 726.
45. Francis v. Network Assocs., Inc., No. 3:01-CV-2768-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2936, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2002).
46. Walsh v. Am. Tele-Network Corp., 195 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
47. Id. at 848.
48. Id. at 850.
49. Id.
50. Decorative Ctr. Of Houston, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
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stitute an independent tort in the context of alleged interference with
prospective contracts. In that case, an independent publisher of directo-
ries-which had previously been authorized to publish the official direc-
tory of the Houston Decorative Center-was no longer authorized; but
according to the plaintiff, the publisher solicited the tenants anyway to
advertise in a new directory, implying business as usual. The Decorative
Center alleged that the publisher's solicitations tortiously interfered with
the Decorative Center's own prospective contracts, asserting that but for
these solicitations, there was "a reasonable probability that the [Decora-
tive Center] and each of its 131 tenants would have entered into a con-
tractual relationship for each tenant's advertising" in Plaintiff's own
[authorized] Building Directory."'s The court held that the building
owner sufficiently alleged a reasonable probability for the likelihood of a
contract-a reasonable probability, not a reasonable certainty as the de-
fendant asserted, being all that is required. 52 Following Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., the court held that lack of justification and privilege are no longer
required elements to be proven in a claim of tortious interference with
prospective business relations.53
The court observed, however, that to maintain its cause of action the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant "committed 'an indepen-
dently tortious or unlawful act that prevented the relationship from oc-
curring." 54 Here the court warned that a state law unfair competition
claim might not be sufficient to constitute the independent tort or unlaw-
ful act necessary, since that claim itself contains the element that there be
an underlying tort or illegal act; the court did not reach "[t]he viability of
[the] theory" that an "alleged violation of the Lanham Act (a statutory
claim) [could be] the independent unlawful act."'55 The court was reluc-
tant to grant a motion to dismiss, but "in order for the parties to more
precisely join issue and to ready this case for further proceedings," the
court ordered the plaintiff promptly to file a supplement to its amended
complaint to clarify the precise theory of its claim for tortious interfer-
ence for prospective business relations.56
In Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.,57 plaintiff sold
bottled water in facilities owned and operated by a city - that is, until the
city granted a competitor exclusive rights to sell bottled water on its prop-
erty for ten years. In addition to claiming that this constituted an illegal
combination or conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws, the plaintiff
alleged claims of tortious interference with existing and prospective busi-
ness relationships. 58 Interestingly, the court seemed to distinguish be-
51. Id. at 732.
52. Id. at 733.
53. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 S.W.3d at 726-27).
54. Id. at 734.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Apani S.W., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Entrs., Inc., 300 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2002).
58. Id. at 624.
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tween a cause of action for interference with existing or prospective
contracts, and interference with existing or prospective business relation-
ships. 59 In this case, it viewed the plaintiff's relationship with the city as a
favorable business relationship, as opposed to being the subject of an ex-
isting contract, even an at-will one. Turning first to the cause of action for
tortious interference with an existing business relationship, the court
cited a 1978 state appellate court case as authority to identify the ele-
ments as "(1) unlawful actions undertaken without justification or excuse;
(2) with intent to harm; and (3) actual damages. '60 It added that the
plaintiff did not need to prove the existence of a valid claim, but "only
that the defendant's interference was motivated by malice. '61 Here, be-
cause the court concluded that the defendant's actions did not violate the
antitrust laws and that "entering into an exclusive agreement, in and of
itself, does [not] constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade," it af-
firmed the trial court's summary judgment.62
Turning then to the claim for tortious interference with prospective
business relations, the court interestingly observed that the Texas Su-
preme Court had "not yet set out all the elements of a [claim of] tortious
interference with a prospective business contract or relations claim," and
that the appellate courts had not been uniform in characterizing its ele-
ments.63 (This might be a seemingly curious claim, in view of the hold-
ings in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, but this was not the only court to
reach the same conclusion; the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Dis-
trict concluded the same in Baty v. ProTech Insurance Agency.)64 Some,
for example, required a plaintiff merely to show that it was "reasonably
probable" that the parties would have entered into a business or contrac-
tual relationship, as opposed to "reasonably certain. '65 In any event,
however, the court observed that in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, the
Texas Supreme Court had made clear that "to establish liability for inter-
ference with a prospective contractual or business relation the plaintiff
must prove that it was harmed by the defendant's conduct that was either
independently tortious or unlawful," and that "by independently tor-
tious" that court meant "conduct that would violate some other recog-
nized tort duty."'66 The court held this alleged conduct was not
independently tortious or unlawful.67 Furthermore, it did not violate the
59. Id. at 634.
60. Id. at 633-34 (citing Morris v. Jordan Fin. Corp., 564 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
61. Id. at 634 (citing CF&I Steel Corp. v. Pete Subett & Co., 623 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
62. Id. at 634. (In light of the previous holdings in the opinion, the omission of the
word "not" in that sentence in the reported opinion appears to have been a typographical
error.)
63. Id.
64. Baty v. ProTech Ins. Agency, 63 S.W.3d 841, 859 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, no pet.).
65. Apani S.W., Inc., 300 F.3d at 634.
66. Id. at 634-35 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 S.W.2d at 713).
67. Id. at 635.
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antitrust laws, or establish claims as asserted under the Texas constitution
or the municipal bidding statute.68 Accordingly the trial court's judgment
was affirmed.69
In Baty, the court held that, considering the teachings of Sturges and
other recent cases, the elements of tortious interference with prospective
business relationships appear to be:
(1) a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered
into a business relationship; (2) an independently tortious or unlaw-
ful act by the defendant that prevented the relationship from occur-
ring; (3) the defendant did such act with a conscious desire to
prevent the relationship from occurring or the defendant knew the
interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result
of the conduct; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm or damages
as a result of the defendant's interference. 70
B. STANDING
Standing was an issue in this year's tortious interference actions as well.
In Friends for American Free Enterprise Association v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,71 an association of manufacturer's representatives brought suit
against Wal-Mart for tortious interference, on behalf of the association's
individual members. In this case, the court held that the association
lacked standing to pursue these claims on behalf of the individual mem-
bers. The individuals would have to participate directly themselves. 72
C. PREEMPTION
Preemption was also an issue this year. In Kaufman v. Allied Pilots
Association,73 the airline pilots association had held a work slow down
(sometimes called a "sick out"). The airline passengers' class action was
brought against the union for state law tortious interference with con-
tract. The court held that the state law claims of tortious interference
with contract were "Garmon preempted. '74 In Alpha/Omega Insurance
Services, Inc. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,75 however, the
court held that a remedy provided by the State Insurance Code did not
subsume a claimant's conversion and tortious interference claims.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Baty, 63 S.W.3d at 860.
71. Friends for Am. Free Enter. Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 284 F.3d 575 (5th Cir.
2002).
72. Id. at 578.
73. Kaufman v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 274 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 204.




D. CONTRACTS SUBJECT TO INTERFERENCE
Tortious interference claims continue to be mixed with claims involving
alleged breach of noncompetition covenants. In Louisiana Transporta-
tion, Inc. v. Race,76 a noncompetition covenant was held to have been
unenforceable since the only consideration for it offered to an at-will em-
ployee was employment and/or continued employment. Because the
noncompetition contract was thus unenforceable, the court held that it
was not a contract properly subject to a claim of tortious interference,
and hence the defendant could not have tortiously interfered with it.77
Similarly, in Olander v. Compass Bank,78 a bank employer had in-
cluded noncompetition provisions in an employee's stock option agree-
ment. These provisions were held not to be ancillary to an otherwise
enforceable agreement under Texas law, and as a result, the former em-
ployer's application for a preliminary injunction was denied.79
E. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The statute of limitations for tortious interference is two years in Texas,
but there is sometimes dispute as to when the statute starts to run. In
Collins v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,80 an employee's claims of
slander and tortious interference were held barred by the statute of limi-
tations because she did not specify the date on which the statements were
made and she failed to raise the discovery rule. The court rejected her
argument that her claim for tortious interference was actually a claim for
conspiracy to commit tortious interference and that hence the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until after the "last overt act" with respect
to the conspiracy.81 Significantly, the court repeated its holding from an
earlier case rejecting the "continuing tort theory" that the statute begins
to run when the tortious acts cease. 82 Instead, the court held that "the
statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suffered legal in-
jury."'83 In any event, however, the court also concluded that the only
allegedly tortious act put forth was a statement by her former employer
that one of the sales she had been handling would be given to another
employee.8 4 Similarly, in Snell v. Sepulveda, the court held that the stat-
ute of limitations began running on the actual date the allegedly tortious
conduct occurred, since the "conduct was easily discoverable and was not
76. La. Transp., Inc. v. Race, No. 3:02-CV-2609-N, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19571, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2002).
77. Id.
78. Olander v. Compass Bank, 173 F. Supp. 2d 846 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
79. Id.
80. Collins v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Co., No. CIV. 3:01-CV-0695-H, 2002 WL
1268042 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2002).
81. Id. at *3.








Speculation is not enough, and sufficient evidence is always required.
In U-Fuel, Inc. v. Southwest Research Institute,86 a former customer
brought suit against a research institute alleging that the research insti-
tute had conspired with a competitor, disclosed the former customer's
trade secrets to the competitor, and tortiously interfered with the former
customer's relationships. The action was dismissed, however, as the licen-
sor's evidence that this had actually occurred amounted merely to specu-
lation and nothing more. Similarly, in Willis v. Sweetheart Cup,87 a
dismissed employee sued the former employer for alleged retaliation for
filing an EEOC claim, but the tortious interference claim was dismissed
for want of evidence that would support the allegations.
In Finlan v. Dallas Independent School District88-which was but one
segment of a long history of litigation among these parties-the Dallas
Independent School District had brought suit against several activists for
a variety of activities, including what the District characterized as tortious
interference with the District's relationship with the Goldman Sachs &
Co. investment firm, which was involved in a major bond issue. The ac-
tivists counterclaimed, mainly on claims related to malicious prosecution
but also for claims of tortious interference. The court upheld summary
judgment for the District, however, holding that the activists had failed to
show any summary judgment evidence that the District or the other de-
fendants had "interfered with or damaged any specific contract, prospec-
tive contract, or relationship." 89
G. BREACH OF OWN CONTRACT
It is not common, but occasionally breach of one's own contract may be
held to constitute tortious interference with other agreements or relation-
ships. Consortium Information Services v. National Information Ser-
vices90 presented both breach of contract and tortious interference claims.
In this case, the court agreed that breach of contract may constitute tor-
tious interference when it has the purpose and effect of preventing the
other party from fully enjoying its other business relationships, though it
found no summary judgment evidence that the alleged interference had
caused the plaintiff to lose any customers or other business and hence no
85. Snell v. Sepulveda, 75 S.W.3d 142, 144 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
86. U-Fuel, Inc. v. S.W. Research Inst., No. SA-00-CA-0480-OG, 2002 WL 1492214
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2002).
87. Willis v. Sweethart Cup, No. CIV.A.3:00-CV-1617-BC, 2002 WL 67532 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 11, 2002).
88. Finlan v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 90 S.W.3d 395 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet.
denied).
89. Id. at 412.
90. Consortium Info. Servs. v. Nat'l Info. Servs., No. 3-99-CV-2509-BD, 2001 WL





Tortious interference claims may sometimes be entangled in statutory
or regulatory environments. For example, in Butnaru v. Ford Motor
Co.,92 the plaintiff was a potential (but disappointed) buyer of a car deal-
ership. Ford claimed a contractual right to exercise a right of first refusal
to buy a dealership rather than have it sold to another dealer and exer-
cised that right in this instance. While the issue was pending, however,
the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code was amended to provide that
a manufacturer could not prohibit or prevent a dealer from transferring a
dealership to a qualified applicant. This presented a question of interpre-
tation of the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code, and the manufac-
turer asserted that the plaintiff thus had to first exhaust its administrative
remedies before the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission before it might
approach the court. The Texas Supreme Court held that the tortious in-
terference claims asserted were not governed by the Motor Vehicle Code,
however, and thus fell outside the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction, so
the plaintiff would not have to exhaust its administrative remedies first.
But the Motor Vehicle Commission did have primary jurisdiction over
the claim, as it raised a question of construction of the Code, which was
supposed to be within the Commission's special competence and exper-
tise. Therefore, the trial court was directed to abate the suit and suspend
finally adjudicating the tortious interference and declaratory judgment
claims until the Commission had had a reasonable opportunity to act on
the matter.93
Richter v. Wagner Oil Co.94 presented another familiar fact pattern. In
this case plaintiff Richter had approached a company called Duer Wagner
& Co. with some ideas he had for a natural gas project involving Duer
Wagner's reserves. After a confidentiality agreement was signed, Duer
Wagner was sold and became Wagner Oil Company, and both it and the
plaintiffs began to compete over the right to purchase certain reserves
from Exxon. Wagner prevailed in that competition. When the plaintiffs
brought suit alleging breach of the confidentiality agreement, summary
judgment was affirmed, as the information allegedly used was found to be
outside the scope of the confidentiality agreement. Summary judgment
was also affirmed as to the claim of tortious interference with the plain-
tiffs' prospective business relationships with respect to the new projects
because neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants were entitled to be de-
clared the successful bidder on the new projects, and defendant Wagner's
purchase was determined to be a successful exercise of its own rights.95
91. Id. at *3.
92. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002).
93. Id. at 208.
94. Richter v. Wagner Oil Co., 90 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.
h.).
95. Id. at 898.
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Motivations beyond mere commercial advantage were alleged in
Suprise v. Dekock,96 which presented the interesting question of whether
an action could lie for tortious interference with the use and enjoyment of
real estate. Here, Mr. and Mrs. Suprise had bought a tract of land for
hunting, investment, and their children. According to their petition, their
neighbors were none too pleased and began a course of action to harass
the Suprises and convince them to sell out. The petition alleged that the
neighbors posted the land and called prospective buyers, interfered with
the placement of deer blinds, intentionally scared the game, made per-
sonal threats to hunters, used racial epithets concerning the Suprises'
ethnicity, and threatened to "game fence him out ... ruin his name and
make him 'eat' his investment. ' 97 According to the petition, the net and
intended result of this was that the plaintiffs were forced to sell out
quickly and for less than fair market value. The court held that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment against this claim, as the
pleadings set out both causes of action and were both were recognized
under Texas law.98
Before there may be tortious interference with a contract (as opposed
to tortious interference with favorable business relationships or with pro-
spective contracts), there must first be a contract subject to interference.
This was an issue in Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Killam,99 where the
court determined that an oil company's letters to mineral owners lacked
essential terms of an oil and gas lease and therefore did not sufficiently
identify the subject matter of an alleged agreement between the parties.
As a result, the letters were not considered enforceable contracts as a
matter of law and claims of tortious interference with them were rejected.
(The jury was not asked in this case whether there was interference with
prospective contracts.)
Tortious interference cases are often intensely personal. In Pabich v.
Kellar,100 the litigants had worked together in several business ventures
and had-before the embezzlement-been close friends. The immediate
issue was whether, by signing a certain settlement agreement in Michigan,
the sole shareholder of a closely held corporation could be held person-
ally liable to the former shareholder for tortious interference. The court
held that he could not. The sole shareholder was not a party to, nor did
he sign, the agreement in his individual capacity but only as president of
the corporation. There was no evidence that he used the corporation to
perpetrate a fraud or that he was its alter ego. 10 1 He might still have been
individually liable for the corporation's tortious conduct if he knowingly
participated in it or had actual or constructive knowledge of it, but there
96. Suprise v. Dekock, 84 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. App,-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
97. Id. at 379.
98. Id. at 381.
99. Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Killam, 87 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
no pet.).
100. Pabich v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).
101. Id. at 508.
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was no finding that the corporation had committed a tort or done any-
thing wrong.'0 2 Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court judg-
ment, and rendered judgment for the defendant. 10 3
I. JUSTIFICATION AND PRIVILEGE
Under Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green,10 4 a party is privileged to inter-
fere with the contractual relations of another if it acts in the bona fide
exercise of its own rights, or the interfering party has an equal or superior
right in the subject matter to that of the party to the contract. Justifica-
tion is established as a matter of law when the acts a plaintiff claims con-
stitute interference are done in the defendant's exercise of its own
contractual rights, regardless of the defendant's motives. 10 5 Indeed, a
colorable right asserted in good faith may be privileged, even if it turns
out to have been mistaken. 106
Physicians, Surgeons & Hospitals Professional Services v. Texas Hospi-
tal Insurance Exchange'0 7 was another such example. The plaintiff was
an insurance agency that wished to sell an insurance policy to McKenna
Hospital, an insured member of the defendant Exchange. The agreement
by which the plaintiff insurance agency was authorized to solicit this work
limited commissions to a certain amount, but-apparently without in-
forming the hospital-the plaintiff proposed a policy that contained a
substantial additional commission, which would effectively double the
cost of the insurance to the hospital. The defendant Exchange's president
was informed, however, and he in turn informed the hospital, which de-
clined the offer and bought its insurance somewhere else.10 8 Summary
judgment was upheld, as the court held that recounting truthful informa-
tion would not constitute improper interference, and in any event, the
nature of the relationship between the hospital and the president of the
Exchange was that of insurer/insured, principal/agent, and also company/
owner and one of its owners. 10 9 Accordingly, the president was held to
have been "justified in sharing material and truthful information."' 10
Hospital privileges are another common source of litigation. In Patel v.
Midland Memorial Hospital and Medical Center," 'I a doctor complained
that the summary suspension of his clinical privileges constituted tortious
interference with contractual relations, defamation, breach of contract,
and a violation of his due process rights. Because the pre-suspension pro-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996).
105. Id. at 211.
106. Id.
107. Physicians, Surgeons & Hosps. Prof'l Servs. v. Tex. Hosp. Ins. Exch., No. 03-01-
00373-CV (Tex. App.-Austin July 26, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002
Tex. App. LEXIS 5434.
108. Id. at *2-3.
109. Id. at *8.
110. Id. at *9.
111. Patel v. Midland Mem'! Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2002).
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cess was not practical, however, and the hospital showed it had no choice
but to act quickly to protect patients' safety, the court held that the hospi-
tal's actions did not constitute tortious interference." 2
Justification and privilege were significant, but perplexing, issues in
Baty v. ProTech Insurance Agency. 113 In Baty, four employees resigned
from an insurance agency and formed their own. Four insurance compa-
nies, who enjoyed agency relationships with the former employer and had
insured a number of customers, also granted agency appointments to the
new agency. After settling contract (but not tort) claims against the for-
mer employees, their former employer sued the four insurance carriers
for tortious interference with existing contracts and prospective business
relationships, business disparagement, and civil conspiracy, among other
claims.114
The claims of tortious interference with existing contracts were dis-
missed based on the carriers' affirmative defense of justification. In this
case, the court agreed that in granting the agency appointments, the in-
surance companies were exercising their own contractual rights. Not only
did they have the right to appoint their own insurance agents, they also
(and "more importantly," said the court) had the obligation to honor
their insureds' wishes to change agents from the former employer to the
new agency, and hence their appointments were justified as a matter of
law. 115
The carriers' justification defense with respect to the claims of tortious
interference with prospective business relationships, however, was more
complex, and required examination and application of the principles es-
tablished in the Texas Supreme Court's early 2001 decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Sturges.1 16 In Wal-Mart, the court had held that to recover
on a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relation-
ships (as opposed to interference with contracts already made), a plaintiff
must establish that the defendant's actual conduct would be indepen-
dently actionable under a recognized tort.117 In this analysis, the Texas
Supreme Court reasoned that because neither of two parties can be said
to be more justified or privileged than the other when both are competing
for a goal to which neither is yet entitled, "[j]ustification and privilege are
not useful concepts in assessing interference with prospective relations, as
they are in assessing interference with an existing contract." 1 8 Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals, in Baty, concluded that the defenses of privi-
lege and justification would neither be required nor available actions for
tortious interference with prospective relationships, except of course to
112. Id. at 346-47.
113. Baty v. ProTech Ins., 63 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no
writ).
114. Id. at 846.
115. Id. at 857.
116. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 726-27 (Tex. 2001).
117. Id. at 726.
118. Id. at 717.
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the extent they would apply in assessing the tortiousness of the underly-
ing conduct, which was said to constitute the "independently tortious con-
duct" giving rise to the claim for tortious interference with prospective
relationships.' 19
If privilege or justification was not an issue with respect to tortious
interference with prospective relationships, the question of whether the
insurance companies actually had interfered certainly was. The plaintiff
claimed that the fact that the insurance companies made it possible for
the new agency to offer policies from them made it easy for the new
agency to target their former employer's customer base. Following a line
of Texas cases, however, the court of appeals held that merely participat-
ing in a transaction and accepting the fruits of a broken contract-even
knowing that the former employees would be attempting to move a sub-
stantial amount of the carriers' business from the old agency to the new
one-does not constitute knowing inducement required to impose liabil-
ity for tortious interference. 120 The court did reverse and remand with
respect to one carrier, which had moved for summary judgment on the
ground that it could not be liable for interference with what were in fact
its own contracts and relationships, holding that the real issue lay not in
those relationships but rather in those between the former employer and
its customers.121
There was an additional claim of significance. The former employer
also alleged that the carriers had induced two of the former employees to
breach their fiduciary duties to the former employer. With respect to that
claim, the court recalled that where a third party knowingly participates
in the breach of a duty of a fiduciary, it becomes a joint tortfeasor, and
that "[p]rivileges to this are rare; business competition does not give rise
to one."' 22 The court also recalled, however, the Texas Beef Cattle hold-
ing that this rule does not apply where the third party is doing that which
he has a legal right to do 123 and concluded that, because in this case the
insurance carriers "were contractually obligated to honor any change in
agency appointments submitted by their insureds," their actions were in-
deed privileged.' 2 4
Where a legal right does not so clearly exist, however, justification or
privilege may be a much more difficult issue to sustain. In Vingcard A.S.
v. Merrimac Hospitality Systems, Inc.,125 the jury found that a developer
had tortiously interfered with each of four contractual relationships be-
tween a manufacturer and various customers. The developer claimed
that, because of the manufacturer's prior breach, the developer was enti-
119. Baty, 63 S.W.3d at 858.
120. Id. at 861.
121. Id. at 862-63.
122. Id. at 863 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. a (1958)).
123. Id. (citing Tex. Beef Cattle Co., 921 S.W.2d at 211).
124. Id. at 864.
125. Vingcard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Sys., Inc., 59 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2001, pet. denied).
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tled to terminate the contract between it and the manufacturer and that
whatever flowed from that could not be tortious or wrongful. The court
observed, however, that the developer's argument depended upon a find-
ing that the manufacturer had earlier breached its agreement with the
developer, and since the court of appeals upheld the jury's finding against
the developer in that respect, the court rejected the developer's claim
that its later actions could not constitute tortious interference. 126
J. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL AND
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Issues relating to trade secrets and confidential and proprietary infor-
mation arose most commonly in connection with disputes between for-
mer employers and employees. For example, in Olander v. Compass
Bank,127 the court held that the fact that, since starting a new job with a
new bank, a banker had been approached by and made loans to custom-
ers with whom he had worked at his former job and had drawn on his
experience in his new job, did not establish that he had disclosed or used
confidential information of his prior employer. 128 Credit reports and
other records of the former employer's customers were readily available
and thus not proprietary, and the employee would follow his new em-
ployer's procedures and guidelines and investigate credit conditions anew
anyway. 129
Trade secret issues also arose in discovery disputes in personal injury
cases. For example, in In re Continental Tire North America, Inc.,130 a
plaintiff representative in a personal injury case sought leave for her at-
torney and an expert to enter, inspect, and photograph the defendant tire
manufacturer's factory where the allegedly defective tire had been manu-
factured. The manufacturer strongly objected, however, arguing that
such an inspection would reveal trade secrets and that the plaintiff had
not met her burden of establishing she was entitled to discovery of them.
The trial court agreed to permit the inspection, but the appellate court
disagreed and conditionally granted a writ of mandamus (conditioned, of
course, on the trial court not withdrawing its order granting the plaintiff's
motion). 31 The court reviewed Texas Rules of Evidence 507, as inter-
preted by the Texas Supreme Court in In re Continental General Tire,
Inc.,132 to provide that once the party resisting discovery establishes that
the information is a trade secret, the burden shifts to the requesting party
to establish that the information is necessary for a fair adjudication of the
claims.133
126. Id. at 867.
127. Olander v. Compass Bank, 172 F. Supp. 2d 846 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 856.
130. In re Cont'l Tire N. Am., Inc., 74 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.).
131. Id. at 886.
132. In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1998).
133. Id. at 610.
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Sometimes the cases involve both personal injury and employment re-
lationship issues. In IBP, Inc. v. Klumpe,t34 an employee sued the defen-
dant for injuries incurred in operating a meat-cutting machine. The
defendant had developed guidelines for its operations, which it regarded
as confidential. The employee's stepfather was also an employee of the
defendant and had agreed not to disclose these guidelines. The stepfa-
ther referred his stepson to an attorney, who in turn referred him to a law
firm, and in response to a discovery subpoena from the plaintiff's law
firm, provided the plaintiff's law firm with a copy of the guidelines. In
this action, the court held that once they had the guidelines, disclosing
them in response to the subpoena was absolutely privileged, but there
appeared to be fact issues as to whether the stepfather/employee had ac-
quired them lawfully in the first place, or whether he and the attorney
conspired to give them to the law firm representing his stepson. 135
The year also saw confirmation that the dots must be connected: evi-
dence, not mere inferences resting ultimately on speculation, is required
to sustain a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets and other business
torts. In U-Fuel, Inc. v. Southwest Research Institute,136 the court ac-
cepted the United States Magistrate's recommendations and dismissed by
summary judgment the plaintiff's claims for misappropriation of trade
secrets, as well as claims of tortious interference and conspiracy. In that
case, the plaintiff claimed that Southwest Research Institute breached its
testing, listing, and labeling agreement with the plaintiff by disclosing its
trade secrets to (and conspiring with) a third party. The magistrate judge
found, and the district court accepted, that even if the plaintiff's technol-
ogy was unique and the third party used it in order to build its product,
that would not be evidence that the Institute had disclosed the plaintiff's
trade secrets to the third party, especially as there were indications that
the plaintiff had previously disclosed them directly and that it was possi-
ble to make such a product without using the proprietary technology. 137
Similarly, the magistrate judge found, and the district court agreed, that
even if the Institute was aware of the nondisclosure provisions of the
third party's agreement with the plaintiff, the mere fact that the Institute
tested the third party's product was not evidence that the Institute had
induced the third party to breach that agreement. 138 Quoting from the
famous Texaco v. Pennzoil case the court held that:
... a necessary element of the plaintiff's cause of action is a showing
that the defendant took an active part in persuading a party to a con-
tract to breach it. Merely entering into a contract with a party with
134. IBP, Inc. v. Klumpe, No. 07-00-0221-CV, 2001 WL 1456173 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
Nov. 16, 2001, pet. granted).
135. Id.
136. U-Fuel, Inc. v. S.W. Research Inst., No. SA-00-CA-0480-06, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22074 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2002). The U.S. Magistrate's report is reported at No.
SA-00-CA-48-06, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24793 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2001).




the knowledge of that party's contractual obligations to someone
else is not the same as inducing a breach .... It is necessary that
there be some act of interference or of persuading a party to breach,
for example by offering better terms or other incentives, for tort lia-
bility to arise.' 39
Further, the court found no fact issue with respect to whether the defen-
dant had conspired with the third party by aiding and abetting its alleged
breach of the licensing agreement with the plaintiff as the plaintiff
claimed. Instead, the court pointed out that in Texas, civil conspiracy re-
quires specific intent of the harm or wrongful conduct-not merely proof
that the party intended to engage in the conduct that resulted in the in-
jury-and found the summary judgment evidence insufficient to raise a
fact issue that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to participate
in a conspiracy with the third-party to injure the plaintiff.140
The aftermath of a terminated license agreement, or even an expired
one, is not always pleasant. In Holloman v. 0. Mustad & Sons (USA),
Inc.,141 two agreements related to the manufacture and sale of unpat-
ented fishhooks designed by the plaintiff came to an end. The plaintiff/
inventor claimed that the defendant/manufacturer breached the agree-
ments by continuing to sell the designs without paying him royalties and,
in addition, breached a fiduciary duty and misappropriated his trade
secrets. Under Texas law, however, the court held that the plaintiff must
show the alleged "trade secret was acquired through a breach of a confi-
dential relationship or discovered by improper means," and in this case
the court found that no "confidential relationship existed between the
parties."'1 42 No express confidentiality agreement existed; the plaintiff
produced no summary judgment evidence that he asked the defendant to
keep the designs confidential or that he informed the defendant that he
had submitted the designs in confidence; indeed, he appeared not to be-
lieve he needed to keep these designs secret. That there was no showing
the plaintiff "took any precautions to keep the hook designs ... out of the
public domain" seemed especially significant given the apparent ease
with which knock-offs could be made, and from all these the court con-
cluded that no confidential relationship existed.' 43 Hence, there was no
misappropriation of trade secrets.144
K. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
The statute governing this area, sections 15.50-15.52 of the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code' 45 and the seminal case regarding its interpre-
139. Id. at *6 (citing Texaco v. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768, 803 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e)).
140. Id. at *7.
141. Holloman v. 0. Mustad & Sons (USA), Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 450 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
142. Id. at 459.
143. Id. at 460.
144. Id.
145. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-15.52 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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tation, Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Texas,'1 46 continue to be explored.
In Olander v. Compass Bank,'14 7 an at-will employee accepted a grant
of stock options in connection with which he agreed to a noncompetition
and nondisclosure agreement. Later, he brought a declaratory judgment
action to have the non-compete provisions declared unenforceable. The
court held that because the at-will nature of the employment agreement
was illusory and the confidentiality provisions did not obligate the former
employer to provide confidential information in exchange for the em-
ployee's promise, they were not "otherwise enforceable agreements"
within the meaning of section 15.50 of the Texas Business & Commerce
Code governing the enforceability of noncompetition covenants.148 The
former employer argued that the granted stock options were available in
part at the time of the agreement and thus the grant was not illusory;
even if this were so, however, the court concluded that their grant did not
of itself give rise to an interest in preventing the employee from compet-
ing, and so it was not "ancillary" to an otherwise enforceable agreement
as further required by section 15.50.149
Interestingly, the employer argued that it did in fact disclose confiden-
tial information to the employee, and relying on footnote 6 to Light v.
Centel (which describes certain ways a non-illusory promise can arise in
an at-will employment relationship), the employer claimed to have ac-
cepted, through performance, the employee's offer to maintain the confi-
dentiality of its information and to abide by the noncompetition
covenant. 150 The court rejected this argument, however, explaining that
"[tihe fact that [the employer] in fact did provide confidential informa-
tion does not transform the illusory promise under Texas law into other-
wise enforceable consideration to support the non-compete provision.
Even if the confidentiality provisions are currently enforceable, the non-
compete provision must be evaluated as of the time it was made; prior or
future performance by [the employer] does not suffice.' 51 The court
specifically concluded the Light footnote 6 "does not stand for the pro-
position that a unilateral contract formed when an employer accepts an
employee's offer by performance supports enforcement of a covenant not
to compete."' 52
Noncompetition covenants are not always struck down, however. In
A&A Global Industries, Inc. v. Wolfe,' 53 the plaintiff company bought
certain assets from a competitor in the candy business, including certain
trademarks for particular brands of candy, and hired a manager of the
146. Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994).
147. Olander v. Compass Bank, 172 F. Supp. 2d 846 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
148. Id. at 854.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Light, 883 S.W. 29 at 645 n.6).
151. Id. at 854.
152. Id. at 854 n.11.
153. A&A Global Indus. v. Wolfe, No. 3:01-CV-1515-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18142,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2001).
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selling company who had worked with those brands. Later, the purchaser
came to believe the manager, then its employee, was competing with it in
the sale of what it alleged were counterfeit KA-BLUEY brand candies.
The manager was party to a noncompetition covenant, executed at the
time of the asset purchase agreement, which restricted the manager from
competing with the purchaser for one year after his termination in the
sale of or manufacture of the product items the purchaser had bought
from his previous employer (including KA-BLUEY). The court held that
the noncompetition covenant was indeed ancillary to an otherwise en-
forceable agreement (at least as to the purchasing company, if not its cor-
porate parent, which was not party to the asset purchase agreement), and
further held that the restrictions were reasonable.' 54 The manager was
not restricted from the confectionary business-only from those brands
that had been sold to his new employer and only for one year, which the
court described as "plainly reasonable under Texas law."'155 Interestingly,
the manager argued that a surety bond in the full amount of his salary for
one year would be necessary, claiming such an injunction would effec-
tively prevent him from working in the candy industry for a year. Be-
cause the court specifically concluded it would not so restrict him,
however, it set the bond at just less than half of that amount.156 The
court declined to enjoin alleged infringement of the KA-BLUEY mark in
the United States, finding "no extrinsic evidence" in the movants' evi-
dence that the allegations were true.157
Anderson Chemical Co., Inc. v. Green158 presented a similar situation.
The employee worked for the plaintiff for about eleven years as a sales-
man of water treatment systems. He signed an employment agreement
that committed him to hold his employer's confidential information in
confidence, not to solicit other employees for a time after termination,
and not to compete within a proscribed territory for one year. Upon ter-
mination he did begin work for a competitor, however, and solicited cus-
tomers he had serviced while employed by the plaintiff.' 59 The trial court
declined to enter a temporary injunction, without stating reasons. The
court of appeals held that the plaintiff provided no non-illusory promise
back to the employee in the agreement: "A promise not to disclose an
employee's proprietary information which is later accepted by the em-
ployer's performance in providing that information to the employee is a
unilateral contract that cannot support a covenant not to compete be-
cause it is not otherwise enforceable at the time it is made.' 60 The court
further added that under the particular terms of that agreement, the em-
154. Id.
155. Id. at *13.
156. Id. at *17.
157. Id. at *6.
158. Anderson Chem. Co. v. Green, 66 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no
pet.).
159. Id. at 437.
160. Id. at 438 (citing Light, 883 S.W.2d at 645 n.6.).
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ployee was excused from performing his obligations under the non-com-
pete provisions anyway, due to the employer's prior breach of its
agreement to promote him in accordance with his terms. The court fur-
ther found that in any event, the plaintiff's promise to give ten days no-
tice prior to terminating the employee's employment was not sufficient to
give rise to any interest it might have in restraining him from
competition. 16'
The fact that a noncompetition covenant may be unenforceable, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that a nondisclosure or confidentiality
covenant-even one contained in the same agreement-may be similarly
unenforceable. In this case, however, the trial court declined to enforce it
by injunction, and the appellate court concluded it did not abuse its dis-
cretion in that regard. The evidence showed that the employee did not
take any of the plaintiff's materials with him when he left, and that al-
though he knew the names and approximate business volumes of its cus-
tomers, the same information was generally known by other competitors.
Material contents were written on the drums supplied to customers and
were available to see, and the employee was not familiar with the product
formulas. The same products and equipment were common throughout
the industry, and there were generally few secrets. 162 Accordingly, the
court concluded that either the information the employee received from
the plaintiff was not proprietary or he had not used it adversely. In addi-
tion, the non-solicitation provision provided an interesting twist. During
the same week that the employee resigned, an advertisement appeared in
the local newspaper seeking an experienced water treatment employee.
There was conflicting testimony as to whether the defendant employee
had told another of his former employer's employees that the advertise-
ment was there for his benefit, and the court of appeals held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in basing a decision as to a prob-
able right to recover on the resolution of conflicting evidence in the re-
cord. The court did not apply the same statutory analysis to the
nonsolicitation covenant as it did to the noncompetition covenant. 163
Similarly, in Evans Consoles, Inc. v. Hoffman Video Systems, Inc.,164 a
noncompetition covenant was enforced as to an individual, though re-
formed in scope. Here, the individual had worked for a little over ten
years for plaintiff Evans Consoles, which manufactures technical furni-
ture for specialized uses such as data centers, trading floors, and other
technology intensive systems. After this period, the employee accepted
an offer of stock in the plaintiff corporation and became a management
shareholder. As a condition of this offer, he entered into a "Participation
Agreement" with the plaintiff agreeing to be bound by a confidentiality
agreement, an agreement not to solicit its employees or customers, and a
161. Id. at 439.
162. Id. at 442.
163. Id. at 443.
164. Evans Consoles, Inc. v. Hoffman Video Sys., Inc., No. 3:01-CV-1333-P, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20341 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2001).
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noncompetition covenant lasting for three years after certain exit events
and applying anywhere in the world. 165 He left and joined a competitor
about a year thereafter. In analyzing the covenant not to compete, it was
no defense for the employee that he had not read it, and the court found
that the plaintiff's promises were not illusory and an otherwise enforcea-
ble agreement existed between them. 166 Though the opinion was not spe-
cific on this point, it appears the court considered the grant of stock non-
illusory. The court further concluded that the noncompete agreement
was ancillary to the otherwise enforceable agreement, as he was given
access to confidential and proprietary information including the com-
pany's finances and plans.' 67 The court did not address, however, how
the grant of stock would itself give rise to an interest in restraining the
employee from competing "at the time the agreement was made." Inter-
estingly, the court found that the three year term was not unreasona-
ble;' 68 it had more concern over the scope of activity to be restrained and
the geographic area within which it would apply. With respect to the geo-
graphical area, the court held that "[a]s a reasonable substitution for an
expressed geographical limitation, the Court limits the covenant to re-
strict [the employee] from soliciting former clients with whom he had
dealings at the time he left [the former employer]."' 169 With respect to
the scope of activity, it appeared that he had sold technical furniture on
behalf of the former employer, but went to the new company to sell video
systems. The new company was only recently attempting to gain entry
into the technical furniture market, and at his former employer, sales of
video systems amounted to no more than ten percent, or perhaps less, of
sales. Accordingly, the court concluded it would be unreasonable to pre-
vent the employee from selling video systems for his new employer, but
enjoined the employee from selling technical furniture in the six states
within which he had worked for his former employer. 70
The court did enter an injunction prohibiting the employee from using
confidential information he obtained during his employment with the
plaintiff, noting however that this would not apply to information that "is
or generally becomes available to the public," as provided in the confi-
dentiality agreement.' 7' The court specifically noted that this informa-
tion would include the plaintiff's financial information, which had been
appended as an exhibit to one of the pleadings in the case and hence had
become a matter of public record. (This happens with some frequency in
trade secret litigation.) The court did not find that the employee had
already used or disclosed confidential information of the plaintiff, but it
nevertheless concluded that a preliminary injunction was the "proper
165. Id. at *5-8.
166. Id. at *16.
167. Id. at *17-18.
168. Id. at *20.
169. Id. at *22.
170. Id. at *23-24.
171. Id. at *25-26.
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remedy where an employee has breached, or is in such a position that it is
likely that he will breach, a confidentiality agreement.' 172 In this case, the
court found that the employee was now employed in a position at the new
company in which "it might be difficult to avoid the disclosure or use of
[his previous employer's] confidential information." 173
L. BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT
The distinction between a personal defamation by libel or slander and a
claim for business or commercial disparagement is subtle but important.
An action for defamation is to protect the personal reputation of the ag-
grieved party. 74 If the damages alleged are primarily personal or general
(such as injury to personal reputation, humiliation, or mental anguish),
then the cause of action is for personal defamation by libel or slander,
even though incidental or consequential professional losses may also be
pled and proven. A claim for business or commercial disparagement
(sometimes called "injurious falsehood"), on the other hand, is to protect
the economic interests of the aggrieved party and is appropriate when a
plaintiff alleges interference with commercial or economic relations.
More stringent requirements have always been imposed on the plaintiff
seeking to recover for injurious falsehood in three important respects: (1)
falsity of the statement (falsity is required); (2) fault (malice) of the de-
fendant; and (3) proof of special damages. 75 Lack of privilege is also
required. 176
These principles-which have changed little, if at all, since 1987-were
applied in Newsom v. Brod.177 In this case, the plaintiff brought suit
against his former employer for libel and slander, as well as business dis-
paragement, arising out of the termination of the plaintiff's employment.
The court reviewed the elements and principles of business disparage-
ment, and found "no evidence of the direct, pecuniary loss necessary to
satisfy the special damages element of a claim for business disparage-
ment."' 178 Instead, the only damages alleged were for the personal harm,
if any, he suffered as a result of the allegedly defamatory statements. As
a result, his claim was clearly limited to one of personal defamation, and
it was time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations for libel and
slander instead of falling within the two-year statute applicable to claims
for business disparagement. 179
Truth-even "substantial truth"-remains a defense. In Basic Capital
172. Id. at *28.
173. Id. at *29.
174. Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Ins. Co., 49 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987).
175. Id. at 766 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. g (1977)).
176. Id.
177. Newsom v. Brod, 89 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).




Management, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.,180 a corporation was refer-
enced in published reports of indictments alleging a massive conspiracy to
manipulate stock prices. It brought suit, alleging defamation and busi-
ness disparagement. The court held that "[a] statement that is true or
substantially true cannot support a claim for either defamation or busi-
ness disparagement,"18 1 and further explained that "a statement is sub-
stantially true, and thus not actionable, if its 'gist' or 'sting' is not
substantially worse than the literal truth. '18 2 In this case, the underlying
facts as to the gist of the libelous charge were undisputed, and the court
held as a matter of law that the "taint of the allegedly defamatory state-
ment is certainly no greater in the mind of the average reader than a
more exacting truthful statement would have been," and that a "compari-
son of the challenged statement and the indictment demonstrate[d] that
the article was substantially true and not inaccurate."',8 3
M. CIVIL CONSPIRACY
In Baty v. Protech Insurance Agency,184 the former employer also al-
leged the four insurance companies had conspired to commit tortious in-
terference and to induce two of the former employees to breach their
fiduciary duties to their former employer. In order to prevail on a civil
conspiracy claim, however, the court held that "the plaintiff must show
that the defendant was liable for some underlying tort.1 85 Because the
underlying claims of tortious interference and inducing breach of a fiduci-
ary duty failed, the court held that the carriers could not be held liable for
civil conspiracy with respect to them (in one carrier's case, because the
plaintiff had not raised or briefed the issue). 186 The same was true in
Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.,187 where the plain-
tiff's failure to state a cause of action for violation of the antitrust acts,
the Texas Constitution, municipal bidding requirements, or tortious inter-
ference left its civil conspiracy claim without critical support. 188
In other cases, conspiracy claims were sustained for similar reasons. In
Walsh v. America's Tele-Network Corp., 89 the court noted that civil con-
spiracy is "an entirely derivative claim" and that the plaintiff must "plead
and prove another substantive tort upon which to base a civil conspiracy
claim."' 90 In this case, breach of the Communications Act of 1934 was
180. Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 96 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2002, no pet.).
181. Id. at 480 (citing Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d at 766).
182. Id. at 481.
183. Id. at 482.
184. Baty v. ProTech Ins. Agency, 63 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, pet. denied).
185. Id. at 864 (citing Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 635
(Tex. 1997)).
186. Id.
187. Apani S.W., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 300 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2002).
188. Id. at 635.
189. Walsh v. America's Tele-Network Corp., 195 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
190. Id. at 850 (internal citations omitted).
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not such a tort nor was it breach of contract. Tortious interference would
be, however, as would conversion, and in that case each had been pled
and supported sufficiently to state a cause of action, which would suffice
to sustain a claim of conspiracy. 191
III. TRADEMARK AND TRADE DRESS INFRINGEMENT,
AND COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION
Holdover ex-franchisees, properly terminated for breach of their
franchise agreements, sometimes resist "de-identifying" from the
franchise system by ceasing all use of the franchise marks, but are rarely
successful in the effort. In Pizza Hut, Inc. v. White,192 for example, a
franchisee was terminated for failure to pay royalties and other fees and
preliminarily enjoined from continuing to use the Pizza Hut marks. Pizza
Hut was then directed to initiate arbitration proceedings in accordance
with the parties' franchise agreement. 193
Cybersquatter disputes may also be relatively straightforward, espe-
cially where the plaintiffs' marks are highly distinctive and famous and
the defendants' actions in adopting them as part of the plaintiffs' domain
names appear to have been intentional and unjustifiable. For example, in
Baylor University v. International Star, Inc.,194 the defendant registered
the domain name www.baylorbayers.com and operated a web site located
there without the University's approval. Particularly given that defen-
dant did not respond to the complaint or the plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court had no trouble enjoining any further use,
registration, or holding of registrations for that domain name or any
other domain name that included the mark "Baylor" by the defendant,
and ordered the immediate transfer of that domain name to the
University.
Similarly, in E&J Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd.,' 95 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a Magistrate Judge's decision
under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("APCA") to
enjoin and order the transfer of the domain name
www.ernestandjuliogallo.com to the plaintiff from the defendants, who
operate a family-owned pre-hanging millwork named Doartown, Inc. and
had created Spider Webs, Ltd. to develop internet address names (ap-
proximately 300 of which contain names that could be associated with
existing businesses). 196 The court concluded that the APCA "was passed
to address situations just like this one," in which it appeared the defen-
dant was making a business of warehousing and trafficking in domain
191. Id.
192. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. White, No. 3:02-CV-0790-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19930, at *1
(N.D. Tex Oct. t8, 2002).
193. Id. at *14.
194. Baylor Univ. v. Int'l Star, Inc., No. W-00-CA-231, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23619
(W.D. Tex Nov. 7, 1002).
195. E&J Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd., 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002).
196. Id. at 271.
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names of trademark holders.197 Since the defendant had no actual prop-
erty rights in the name or mark aside from its domain name, the domain
name did not contain the name of any defendant, the defendant had no
prior or current use of it in connection with a bona fide offering of goods
or services, made no bona fide non-commercial or fair use of the mark,
had sold other domain names that were identical or similar to the names
of well known businesses and products, and knew that the plaintiff's mark
was distinctive and famous, the court had no trouble finding that the de-
fendant's conduct was in bad faith, and affirmed the injunction, transfer,
and award of $25,000 in statutory damages under the ACPA accord-
ingly.198 The court agreed it was appropriate to prevent the defendants
from registering or using an internet domain name containing the words
"gallo," "ernest," and "julio" in combination, but added that if the de-
fendants could show a specific, legitimate need for an internet domain
name containing those words, they could "return to the trial court and
ask for a modification of the injunction to allow for that need."' 99
In the 1980s, a flood of counterfeit products, sold surreptitiously by
persons against whom effective relief was notoriously hard to recover by
conventional means, lead first to an expansive view of the federal court's
power to order ex parte temporary restraining orders and seizure or-
ders, 200 and then to passage of the Anti-Counterfeiting Act of 1984,201
which set out a statutory procedure by which ex parte seizure orders
might be sought, obtained, and enforced in situations involving counter-
feit goods. The following years saw increasing and expansive use of such
orders with the not wholly unpredictable result that eventually counter-
claims began to be asserted for wrongful seizures.
Waco International, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding Houston, Inc. 20 2 was one
such case. The defendant, also a scaffolding distributor, sold scaffolding
that was compatible with the products of the plaintiff and others and dis-
tributed brochures that used abbreviations to indicate they were compati-
ble with the plaintiff's and other's products. The plaintiff sought and
obtained an ex parte seizure order under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A), and
seized the defendant's scaffolding and certain business records. At the
post-seizure hearing and preliminary injunction hearing, however, the
Magistrate Judge found that the product seized did not carry a "counter-
feit mark," and that in most cases the defendant was using the plaintiff's
mark in a descriptive sense. 20 3 At trial, the jury awarded the defendant
substantial amounts in attorneys' fees, costs, and punitive damages, but
found the defendant suffered zero dollars in lost profits and zero dollars
197. Id. at 276.
198. Id. at 275-78.
199. Id. at 280.
200. See In re Louis Vuitton, 679 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2000).
202. Waco Int'l Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding Houston, Inc., 278 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2002).
203. Id. at 527.
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in lost good will from the seizure.20 4
The court of appeals affirmed in all respects. In particular, it held that
a seizure may be wrongful where an applicant acted in "bad faith" in
seeking the seizure order or if the goods seized are predominately legiti-
mate merchandise, even if the plaintiff acted in good faith. 20 5 The court
held that there was "no support for the proposition that, in all cases, a
wrongful seizure claimant must show bad faith. °20 6 Significantly, the
court also made clear that the fact that use of a mark may be infringing
does not necessarily mean that a seizure is warranted. The "ex parte
seizure remedy must be narrowly construed, and is not coextensive with
liability for any Lanham Act claim."'20 7 As a result, even if the plaintiff
had prevailed on its trademark infringement claim, its "application for an
ex parte seizure still could be found wrongful. ' 20 8 Further, although the
rationale for the ex parte nature of the seizure stemmed from the furtive-
ness of counterfeiters who would be likely to spirit away or hide the coun-
terfeit goods if given advance notice, the court made clear that "the
primary focus of an ex parte seizure order is on the goods themselves,
rather than any business practice or representation that may give rise to
liability for trademark infringement. '20 9 The court found that Congress
intended that "a seizure must be considered wrongful when the material
to be seized is legitimate, non-infringing merchandise. '210 In this case,
the goods seized did not bear the plaintiff's trademark.
The court of appeals also found that the jury had been properly in-
structed as to the "fair use" doctrine. "Fair use" is defined under 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) as the "use of the name, term, or device charged to
be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark ... of a term or
device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services of such party. 2 1 1 The jury had been in-
structed that "[i]t is acceptable for competitors to use a competitor's
trademarks for comparative or reference purposes. ' 212 The court held
that this clearly falls under the category "descriptive" as defined in
§ 1115(b)(4). 213 Further, the court held that even if the defendant did not
lose profits or good will, it was in fact damaged by reason of the seizure,
and that its attorneys' fees are part of the damages. The court concluded
that "Congress apparently intended that wrongful seizure claimants be
compensated for the attorney fees and costs expended in bringing the
counterclaim, assuming the claimant prevails in establishing "bad faith"
204. Id. at 528.
205. Id. at 530.
206. Id. at 531.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 531-32.
209. Id. at 532.
210. Id.





or that the goods were predominately legitimate. '214
The issue of insurance coverage for trademark infringement continues
to be widely litigated. In Finger Furniture Co., Inc. v. Traveler's Indem-
nity Co. of Connecticut,21 5 the United States Magistrate Judge found for
the insured that the defendant insurer had a duty to defend the insured in
the prior lawsuit alleging infringement of the mark True Value. The in-
sured plaintiff argued that the complaint stated claims under the defini-
tion of advertising injury, namely, "'misappropriation of advertising ideas
or style of doing business,' and 'infringement of copyright, title or slo-
gan."' 216 The carrier argued that the definition of "advertising injury"
did not "include 'trademark infringement, false designation of origin,
trademark dilution [or] unfair competition,"' as alleged in the complaint,
and thus was not covered.217 It further claimed that there was no allega-
tion that the damages the underlying plaintiff supposedly suffered were
caused "by the offending advertising. ' 218 The court found that the under-
lying complaint did indeed address the insured's advertising,219 and noted
from the underlying complaint that the plaintiff alleged it "creates and
runs extensive national and regional advertising programs ... to promote
the [mark]. '220 The court thus found it reasonable to conclude that the
underlying complaint stated a claim for the "misappropriation of adver-
tising ideas," one of the types of "advertising injury" covered under the
policy.22' In addition, the court concluded that the mark could be consid-
ered a "title or slogan," also bringing it within the coverage period.222
The carrier fared no better in asserting two defenses. One, the "prior
publication" exclusion provided that the policy did not apply to advertis-
ing injury arising out of "oral or written publication of material whose
first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period. '223
Here, the court held that if the pleadings are not specific in alleging
clearly that the insured infringed upon the plaintiff's mark before the cov-
erage period began, and if "there is, even potentially, a claim within the
[p]olicy's coverage, then the relevant exclusion does not apply to obviate
a duty to defend. '224 Because the pleadings were not specific on that
point, it was possible to construe the complaint to allege that the first
infringing publication occurred after the policy period began, and so the
duty to defend was triggered. Further, though the policy excluded cover-
age for an advertisement published with "knowledge of [its] falsity," the
214. Id. at 535.
215. Finger Furniture Co. v. Traveler's Indem. Co. of Conn., No. H-01-2797, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15351, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2002).
216. Id. at *21.
217. Id. at *21-22.
218. Id. at *22.
219. Id. at *27-29.
220. Id. at *31.
221. Id. at *31-32.
222. Id. at *32.
223. Id. at *33.
224. Id. at *40.
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court held that the insured could have been found liable under the under-
lying complaint for trademark infringement without any finding that it
had knowledge of the alleged falsity.22 5 Accordingly, that exclusion was
held not to apply either, and the duty to defend remained.
Where injunctive relief is not thought to be appropriate, but where
some step seems necessary to alleviate a likelihood of confusion, dis-
claimers are sometimes employed. In Westchester Media Co., L.P. v.
PRL USA Holdings,226 the issue of what remedy would be appropriate
had been remanded to the district court. 22 7 The trial court had found that
Westchester had infringed the PRL trademark polo in its new Polo maga-
zine directed to equestrian enthusiasts, but it vacated the broad injunctive
relief granted by the trial court, and remanded the matter for the trial
court to consider "whether a disclaimer procedure better comports with
First Amendment principles than an outright probition on Westchester's
use of 'Polo' for New POLO Magazine. '228
On remand, the court noted, as the Fifth Circuit had found, the maga-
zine's title "is a hybrid of commercial and artistic speech, and as such, it
intersects, if not collides with, competing trademark and [F]irst
[A]mendment interests.122 9 Even where trademark infringement has
been found, "[F]irst [A]mendment interests should influence the choice
of remedy. '2 30
Earlier, the court had fashioned its own disclaimer language, but con-
cluded that the disclaimer in use was "only 'minimally effective' to dispel
confusion,"2 31 and concluded that "a more concise disclaimer, consist-
ently placed in a more prominent position" on the magazine, would be
better.2 32 Accordingly, the court ordered that the disclaimer "not affili-
ated with Polo Ralph Lauren" was to be written in a legible black type in
a white box with a black border and type, to appear prominently in every
instance in which the plaintiff used "Polo" on the magazine's cover, to be
at least 16 point font on the cover, and to be no less than one-half the size
of the "Polo" name in all other locations. 233
Mislabeling products and their packaging can have serious criminal
consequences, which at least one set of defendants narrowly averted. In
United States v. Hanafy,234 the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's acquittal of the defendants despite a jury verdict finding them
guilty of mislabeling and trademark infringement in violation of 18 U.S.C.
225. Id. at *42-44.
226. Westchester Media Co., L.P. v. PRL USA Holdings, No. H-97-3278, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17468, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2001).
227. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
228. Id. at 675.
229. Westchester Media, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17468, at *63 (citing Westchester Media,
214 F.3d at 673).
230. Id. at *64 (citing Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 672).
231. Westchester Media, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17468, at *75.
232. Id. at *78.
233. Id. at *80.
234. United States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2002).
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§ 2320 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 333(a2), and 321(m). In that case, the
defendants bought individual cans of infant formula from various conve-
nience stores and other sources and then re-packaged the cans into trays.
They marked the shipping trays with the trademarks of the manufacturers
whose goods were contained and re-sold these trays to other wholesalers.
The goods themselves were genuine, although they were not packaged by
the original manufacturers for re-sale in this form, and all were sold
within the "sell by" date. The court held as a matter of law that the pack-
aging did not constitute a "counterfeit" under 18 U.S.C. § 2320 and that
the marks on the shipping trays did not constitute "labeling" as a matter
of law under 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a)2.235 Although re-packaging
the goods without the manufacturer's approval or control may give rise to
civil liability under the Lanham Act, the court concluded that attaching a
mark to trays containing the "genuine unadulterated, unexpired products
associated with that mark does not give rise to criminal liability under
§ 2320."236 Further, it held that "merely identifying the contents of a
shipping tray with no more information than that which is already upon
the articles themselves does not 'explain' or provide 'substantial informa-
tion' so as to rise to the level of 'labeling' as contemplated by [applicable
precedents]. "237
235. Id.
236. Id. at 489.
237. Id. at 490.
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